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Abstract 
This study investigated whether children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and typically 
developing children matched on receptive language share resources fairly and reciprocally. 
Children completed age-appropriate versions of the Ultimatum and Dictator Games with real 
stickers and an interactive partner. Both groups offered similar numbers of stickers 
(preferring equality over self-interest), offered more stickers in the Ultimatum Game, and 
verbally referenced ‘fairness’ at similar rates. However, children with ASD were significantly 
more likely to accept unfair offers and were significantly less likely to reciprocate the 
puppet’s offers. Failure to reciprocate fair sharing may significantly impact on social 
cohesion and children’s ability to build relationships. These important differences may be 
linked to broader deficits in social-cognitive development and potentially self-other 
understanding. 
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Do children with autism spectrum disorder share fairly and reciprocally? 
Sharing is a crucial foundation of human evolution (Dunbar, 1993; Winterhalder, 
2001) and involves relinquishing ownership or control of access to a commodity for someone 
else’s benefit. For decades, behavioural economists have examined the conflict between 
retaining valued possessions and sharing with others via resource-exchange tasks. In the 
Ultimatum Game, an individual is endowed with a desirable resource and is required to offer 
a proportion to a partner who has nothing. On acceptance, the resource is split as proposed 
and both parties keep a share. On rejection, neither party keeps any of the resource. Thus, the 
proposer must strategically balance self-interest (i.e. the desire to retain as much of the 
resource as possible) against their partner’s interests. The Dictator Game follows the same 
format except for one crucial difference: the partner must always accept whatever share is 
offered. It is widely argued that players’ responses in these tasks are directed by socially-
learned norms concerning fairness (Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, 2008) and the ability to infer 
the mental states of social partners via Theory of Mind (ToM; Castelli et al., 2010; Takagishi 
et al., 2014). Here, we explore whether children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) – a 
population characterised by impairments in social interaction and theory of mind (APA, 
2013; Baron-Cohen, 1995) – show differences in resource sharing while playing age-
appropriate versions of the Ultimatum and Dictator Games. 
According to the economic model of rational self-interest, proposers should always 
make the smallest possible offers, and responders in the Ultimatum Game should accept any 
offer greater than zero (Camerer, 2003). However, across dozens of studies, typically 
developing (TD) adults consistently offer 40-45% of the stake in the Ultimatum Game and 
20-25% in the Dictator Game (despite having the option to offer less without fear of 
rejection; Camerer, 2003; Henrich et al., 2005; Rigdon, 2003). The generosity of these 
average offers reflects a general preference for fairness and equality. Indeed, adults will 
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usually reject offers they perceive to be unfair, and failure to behave reciprocally elicits 
punishment and negative affect in exchange partners (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; de Quervain et 
al., 2004). Lucas, Wagner and Chow (2008) investigated whether TD children aged 4-5 years 
similarly value fairness when sharing endowed commodities. This was achieved by designing 
age-appropriate versions of the Ultimatum and Dictator Games that employed stickers as a 
resource (rather than money, tokens, or points), and stakes were distributed immediately after 
each round (rather than at the end of the task). The results showed that TD children offered 
47% and 40% of stakes in the Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game respectively. Therefore, 
despite the natural desire to retain one’s own resources, even young TD children value 
fairness over self-interest in sharing contexts (see also Brownell, Iesue, Nichols, & Svetlova, 
2013; Castelli, Massaro, Sanfey, & Marchetti, 2014). 
Many theorists have argued that children’s early-emerging inclination to share equally 
(and reciprocate others’ sharing behaviours) has adapted to promote cooperation and 
diminish the impact of self-interests on social cohesion (Hoffman et al., 2008). Upholding 
shared expectations concerning fairness provides a foundation for positive and reciprocal 
interactions, and establishes one’s reputation as a good social partner (which may be a 
stronger motivating factor in typical development than greater material or instrumental 
outcomes; Adamson et al., 2010; Dawson et al., 2004; Greene et al., 2011; Hoffman et al., 
2008). From 3-years, TD children display strong adverse reactions when they are 
disadvantaged by unequal distributions (despite showing little willingness to share 
themselves; LoBue et al., 2011). By 4-years, TD children can infer the emotions, needs, and 
interests of social partners, and are able to differentiate these from their own (Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001). At 5-years, they make explicit verbal references to fairness, 
demonstrate a motivation to engage in behaviour that benefits others, and show generosity 
when sharing resources with partners (Fehr et al., 2008; Güroğlu et al., 2009; Lucas et al., 
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2008). Thus, TD children may offer nearly half of a valued resource in the Ultimatum Game 
because they can represent the perspective of the responder and are aware that a lower offer 
may be construed as “unfair”. In support of this reasoning, TD children with superior ToM 
skills make higher mean offers and are more likely to reject unfair offers in the Ultimatum 
Game (Castelli et al., 2010; Takagishi et al., 2010; Takagishi et al., 2014). Taken together, 
this evidence suggests that TD children’s preference for sharing fairly in resource-exchange 
tasks is driven by sensitivity to social norms and awareness of others’ perspectives. 
If the development of equal sharing is underpinned by social norms and awareness of 
others’ mental states, we may expect to observe qualitative differences in ASD. Children with 
ASD show diminished social motivation and experience difficulties interacting with others 
(APA, 2013; Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012). Compared with TD 
children, those with ASD spend less time engaged in social interactions with peers 
(Bauminger et al., 2008), are less likely to collaborate (Aldridge et al., 2000; Carpenter et al., 
2001; van Ommeren, Begeer, Scheeren, & Koot, 2012), and are less likely to reciprocate in 
naturalistic interactions (Channon et al., 2001; Hadwin et al., 1997; Wimpory et al., 2007; 
Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004; Klin et al., 2006; Ozonoff & Miller, 1995). It is also widely 
acknowledged that children with ASD have fundamental impairments in intention reading 
and ToM (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen, Baldwin, & Crowson, 1997; Charman, 
Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Cox, Baird, & Drew, 1997; D’Entremont & Yazbek, 2007; 
Griffin, 2002; Hartley & Allen, 2014, 2015; Hobson, 2002; Mundy & Willoughby, 1996; 
Preissler & Carey, 2005). These deficits result in reduced understanding and consideration of 
others’ psychological states both separately and in relation to one’s own interests. 
Theoretically, it is possible that these social-cognitive difficulties impact children’s 
preferences for fairness and reciprocity when sharing resources. Indeed, it may be that 
sharing in children with ASD is primarily motivated by instrumental outcomes, and is 
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influenced less by the behaviours and mental states of social partners (Schmitz, Banerjee, 
Pouw, Stockmann & Rieffe, 2015).  
To date, few studies have investigated the sharing behaviour of children with ASD 
using resource-exchange tasks. In Sally and Hill (2006), high-functioning children with ASD 
aged 6-15 years played computerised versions of the Ultimatum and Dictator games, in 
which ‘points’ served as proxies for real resources. While children with ASD made similar 
offers to TD controls in the Dictator Game, the groups diverged in the more strategic 
Ultimatum Game. Whereas most TD children shared the resource equally, many children 
with ASD – particularly those who failed a false belief test – tended to offer one or zero 
points (out of 10). Furthermore, when offered 30% or less of the total stake, children with 
ASD accepted on approximately 30% of trials, whereas TD controls accepted on just 11%. In 
another study, Schmitz and colleagues (Schmitz et al., 2015) tested “cognitively able” 
children with ASD and TD controls aged 9-14 years on a computerised version of the 
Dictator Game in which they decided how to distribute coins between themselves and an 
anonymous partner. Crucially, children could choose either an equal distribution (1 point 
each) or an unequal distribution that benefited either the participant (2 vs 1) or the partner (1 
vs 2). Although both populations tended to select the equal split, children with ASD were 
more likely to select unequal distributions of either type. Recently, in Paulus and Rosal-
Grifoll (2016), 3-6 year old children with ASD and TD controls matched on non-verbal 
ability were tasked with sharing resources with partners that were rich or poor. Unlike TD 
children who consistently split the resources equally between parties, children with ASD 
allocated most of the resources to the other recipients and kept relatively little for themselves.  
The findings from these three studies suggest that children with ASD have a diminished 
aversion to inequity and are less concerned about their own gains. Furthermore, their sharing 
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tends to maximize resources across parties, accommodating both advantageous and 
disadvantageous inequality. 
Atypical sharing behaviour and weaker preferences for equality could have important 
implications for children’s social relationships. Specifically, these characteristics may place 
children with ASD at increased risk of bullying. Recent estimates suggest that up to 87% of 
children with ASD are bullied every week or month, placing them at significantly higher risk 
than TD children (Cappadocia, Weiss, & Pepler, 2012; Wainscot et al., 2008). Due to their 
socially incongruent behaviour and difficulties conforming to social norms, children with 
ASD are often perceived as ‘different’ by their peers (Humphrey & Lewis, 2008; Van 
Roekel, Scholte, & Didden., 2010). This can impact their ability to develop friendships 
(Bauminger & Kasari, 2000; Chamberlain et al., 2007), leading to feelings of isolation and 
increasing the likelihood of victimisation (Bauminger, Schulman, & Agam, 2003; Hodges et 
al., 1999; Humphrey & Symes, 2011). If children with ASD are more receptive to unfair 
social behaviour and less concerned about their personal gain, this could significantly 
increase their risk of exploitation or manipulation.  
The objective of this study was to explore the sharing behaviour of children with ASD 
and language-matched TD controls via age-appropriate versions of the Ultimatum Game and 
Dictator Game. In doing so, we advance the literature in three important ways. Firstly, prior 
studies have relied upon computer-based tasks that involve sharing “virtual resources” with 
hypothetical or inanimate partners. Lucas et al. (2008) point out that children may not 
understand that points represent commodities, and may behave differently when required to 
share tangible rewards with real partners. Thus, we increased the stakes of sharing by 
endowing children with attractive stickers (a valued resource often used to reward and 
reinforce positive behaviour in both populations), and instructing them to share with a 
pseudo-animate partner (a puppet) in a face-to-face context. Secondly, we explored how 
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children’s offers are influenced by the offers of their partner. Previous studies document 
children’s offers and responses, but do not test the extent to which children with ASD 
reciprocate fair or unfair offers. Exploring this behaviour will provide an indication of 
children’s sensitivity to the fairness norm and their ability to adapt to others’ behaviour. 
Thirdly, the rationale underpinning the sharing behaviours of children with ASD is currently 
unknown. We shed light on this motivation by recording and analysing children’s verbal 
justifications of their offers and responses when resources are distributed. In addition, we 
conducted an ‘unexpected contents’ false belief task to establish whether ToM relates to 
sharing behaviour. Based on previous resource exchange studies (Sally & Hill, 2006; Schmitz 
et al., 2015) and evidence of reduced social reciprocity (e.g. Klin et al., 2006), we expected to 
observe a diminished preference for equality, reduced reciprocation of fair offers, and fewer 
verbal references to “fairness” in children with ASD. In comparison to previous studies, we 
anticipated that the increasingly social context and real-life rewards may heighten self-
interest in the ASD group. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 15 verbal children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (13 male; M age 
= 9.2 years, range = 7.1–11.1 years) and 18 TD children (12 male; M age = 4.3 years, range = 
3–6.1 years) recruited from two specialist schools and one mainstream school in Cheshire, 
UK. As cognitive development in ASD is often delayed relative to chronological age 
(Anderson, Oti, Lord, & Welch, 2009), we adopted Sally and Hill’s (2006) approach of 
matching samples on language comprehension rather than chronological age (allowing us to 
assume with reasonable confidence that participants in both groups could understand the 
task). Samples were closely matched on receptive vocabulary as measured by the British 
Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; ASD: M age equivalent: 5.1 years, SD: 1.67; TD: M age 
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equivalent: 4.83 years, SD: 1.59; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 1997). As every child with 
ASD had delayed linguistic development in comparison to their chronological age, our 
sample is representative of a significant proportion of the clinical population (Anderson et al., 
2007). All children with ASD were diagnosed by a qualified educational or clinical 
psychologist, using standardised instruments (i.e. Autism Diagnostic Observation Scale and 
Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised; Lord, Rutter, DiLavore & Risi, 2002; Lord, Rutter & 
Le Couteur, 1994) and expert judgement. Diagnoses were confirmed via the Childhood 
Autism Rating Scale (CARS; Schopler, Reichler, DeVellis, & Daly, 1980), which was 
completed by each participant’s class teacher (ASD: M score = 31.78; TD: M score = 15.42). 
Children with ASD were significantly older (t(31) = 13.24, p < .001, d = 4.52), and had 
significantly higher CARS scores (t(34) = 8.28, p < .001, d = 2.84) than the TD children. The 
study was approved by the University Ethics Committee, and informed consent was obtained 
from children’s caregivers prior to their involvement in the research. 
Materials 
Following Lucas et al., (2008), brightly-coloured stickers were used as trading items 
in the Ultimatum and Dictator Games as they are desirable and often used as positive 
reinforcers. Every child was presented with 8 sets of 8 stickers (one set per trial of each 
game). The sticker sets were different from one another in order to maintain interest and 
motivation throughout each game (e.g. smiley faces, animals, stars etc). However, within a 
set, stickers were thematically similar (e.g. differently coloured stars) to reduce the likelihood 
that children would develop strong preferences for individual stickers that would impact their 
willingness to trade. In line with previous studies of this nature, children interacted with a 
human-looking hand puppet that matched their gender (“Jack” or “Jill”) during the 
experimental tasks (e.g. Kanngiesser & Hood, 2014). Children were unlikely to view the 
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puppet as an authority figure, meaning their trading decisions would not be influenced by 
unequal status.  
For the Unexpected Contents task, a Smarties tube was emptied and filled with small 
colouring pencils. Three pictures were created to facilitate the responding of children with 
ASD if necessary (depicting a tube of Smarties, colouring pencils, and a rainbow). 
 Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in their own schools and were accompanied by a 
familiar adult. Children were verbally praised for attention and good behaviour. Participants 
completed three test sessions on different days. Session one consisted of the BPVS. Session 
two involved the Ultimatum or Dictator Game (counterbalanced across participants). Session 
3 involved either the Ultimatum or Dictator Game (whichever was not played in Session 2) 
followed by the Unexpected Contents Task.  
 Ultimatum Game. The Ultimatum game consists of two roles: proposer and 
responder. The roles alternated between the child and puppet over 4 trials (e.g. the child was 
the proposer for trials 1 and 3). Half of the participants started in the proposer role, while the 
other half started in the responder role. When in the proposer role, the child was given 8 
stickers (per trial) and instructed to give some to the puppet, with a one sticker minimum 
offer. If the puppet accepted the offer, the stickers were divided as proposed. If the puppet 
rejected, neither player received any stickers. When in the responder role, the child accepted 
or rejected an offer from the puppet. Acceptance lead to both parties receiving stickers while 
rejection meant neither party received any stickers. The puppet offered 1 sticker (unfair offer) 
on one trial and 4 stickers (fair offer) on another trial (order randomly predetermined). The 
puppet accepted one of the child’s offers and rejected the other (order randomly 
predetermined). After making their offers, children were asked why they had made this 
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decision (“Why did you give Jack that number of stickers?”). They were also asked how they 
felt about each of the puppet’s offers (“Do you want that many stickers? Why?”). 
Dictator Game. This game followed the same procedure as the Ultimatum game, 
except the responder was unable to reject the proposer’s offer. The proposer role alternated 
between the child and puppet over 4 trials (e.g. the child was the proposer for trials 1 and 3). 
Half of the participants started in the proposer role, while the other half received the puppet’s 
offer first. As the proposer, children were given 8 stickers (on each trial) and instructed to 
give some to the puppet, with a one sticker minimum offer. They were informed that the 
puppet had to accept their offer (e.g. “Jack has to take the number of stickers you give him”). 
The puppet offered 1 sticker (unfair offer) on one trial and 4 stickers (fair offer) on another 
trial (order randomly predetermined). Children were asked to explain their offers, and 
describe how they felt about the puppet’s offers.  
Unexpected Contents Task. The puppet was hidden from view at the start of this 
task (they were “sleepy and needed a nap”). Children were shown a Smarties tube and asked 
what they thought was inside. The tube was opened to reveal small coloured pencils instead 
of Smarties. The pencils were placed back inside the Smarties tube and the puppet “woke 
up”. Children were then asked 3 questions in a random order: (a) “what does Jack/Jill think is 
inside?”, (b) “what did you think was inside when you first saw it?”, and (c) “what is really 
inside?” (a memory check to identify children who were guessing or did not understand). 
Children with ASD who had limited expressive language responded to each question by 
pointing to one of three colour pictures depicting a tube of Smarties, colour pencils, and a 
rainbow (to control for guessing).  
Results 
When children were in the proposer role, we recorded the number of stickers they 
offered the puppet on each trial. In the Ultimatum Game we recorded whether children 
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accepted or rejected each of the puppet’s offers and we also recorded children’s verbal 
comments in both games.  
Ultimatum Game 
Children’s offers. On average, children with ASD offered 2.93 (SD: 1.22; 36.63% of 
the total stake) stickers on their first turn in the proposer role, and 3.53 (SD: 1.77; 44.13%) 
stickers on their second turn. By comparison, TD children offered 3.72 (SD: 2.22; 46.5%) 
stickers on their first turn as proposer, and 3.06 (SD: 1.39; 38.25%) on the second. These data 
were entered into a 2 (Population: TD, ASD) x 2 (Offer: First, Second) mixed ANOVA, 
which revealed no significant effects. Thus, an ASD diagnosis did not significantly impact 
first or second offers made by children in the Ultimatum Game. 
We then tested whether children’s offers were influenced by their starting role: 
proposer or responder. Data from each population were entered into a 2 (Order: child first, 
puppet first) x 2 (Offer: first offer, second offer) mixed ANOVA. These analyses revealed no 
effects, suggesting that neither group’s offers were influenced by whether the participant 
started in the proposer or responder role. To assess whether the populations differed when 
making initial offers without a prior cue (e.g. a preceding offer from the puppet) we 
conducted an independent samples t-test. The results confirmed that the first offers of TD 
children and children with ASD who started in the proposer role did not significantly differ in 
the Ultimatum Game. 
While the analyses of children’s numerical offers have not revealed any significant 
differences between populations, it is important to note that they do not consider the 
influence of the puppet’s behaviour. Reciprocity is a vital aspect of sharing and we were 
interested to discover whether the fairness of children’s offers was influenced by the fairness 
of the puppet’s offers. When the puppet made a fair offer, TD children responded with a fair 
offer 93% of the time, or an offer that favoured themselves 7% of the time. When the puppet 
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made an unfair offer, TD children responded with a fair offer 36% of the time, an offer that 
favoured themselves 64% of the time, and never made offers that favoured the puppet. Thus, 
the offers of TD children appear to be strongly mediated by the puppet’s behaviour; when 
they received a fair or unfair offer, they responded in kind on nearly 80% of trials. When 
children with ASD received a fair offer from the puppet, they responded with a fair offer 56% 
of the time, or an offer that favoured themselves 44% of the time. When the puppet made an 
unfair offer, children with ASD responded with a fair offer 25% of the time, an offer that 
favoured themselves 42% of the time, and an offer that favoured the puppet 33% of the time. 
These frequencies suggest that the children with ASD were less likely to reciprocate the 
puppet’s actions compared to TD children; they reciprocated fair and unfair offers just 49% 
of the time.  
We tested whether children with ASD were statistically less likely to reciprocate the 
puppet’s offers in the Ultimatum Game via a generalized linear mixed-effects model 
(GLMM). The analysis modelled the probability (log odds) of children reciprocating the 
puppet’s offer (yes/no), considering variation across participants (random intercepts), fixed 
effects of Population (ASD/TD) and Puppet’s Offer (fair/unfair), plus the interaction between 
these variables. We conducted a sequence of GLMMs, entering fixed effects simultaneously. 
Model 1 was a “null model” containing only the random effect of participant ID. Model 2 
added main effects of Population and Puppet’s Offer. Model 3 then added the Population x 
Puppet’s Offer interaction. We evaluated the relative utility of each increasingly-complex 
model using likelihood ratio tests. These indicated that inclusion of the main effects in Model 
2 yielded a significant improvement in fit over the null model, χ2 (2) = 8.16, p = .017. Adding 
the interaction afforded no further improvement. Therefore, Model 2 provides the best fitting 
explanation of the observed data (see Table 1). In support of our hypotheses, the results show 
that children with ASD were significantly less likely than TD controls to reciprocate the 
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puppet’s offers in the Ultimatum Game (49% vs 78.5%). However, across populations, there 
was no difference in reciprocation rates for fair or unfair offers made by the puppet. 
[insert Table 1 here] 
Children’s responses. Next, we explored how children responded to the puppet’s fair 
and unfair offers. For each population, the relationship between the puppet’s offers (fair 
offer, unfair offer) and children’s responding (accept, reject) was measured via a McNemar 
test. The responses of TD children were significantly mediated by the fairness of the puppet’s 
offer, p < .001. They accepted 94% of fair offers and 11% of unfair offers made by the 
puppet. The responses of children with ASD were also mediated by the fairness of the 
puppet’s offer, p = .016. They accepted 100% of fair offers and 40% of unfair offers. These 
data suggest that both groups were overwhelmingly biased towards accepting the puppet’s 
offer of 4 stickers (likely recognising it as fair), but the children with ASD were nearly 30% 
more likely than the TD children to accept the puppet’s unfair offer of 1 sticker. The 
significance of this difference was tested by examining the relationship between population 
(TD, ASD) and children’s responding (accept, reject) to fair and unfair offers separately. For 
unfair offers, a chi square test of independence revealed a borderline relationship, χ2 (1, N = 
33) = 3.72, p = .054, φ = .34, suggesting that children’s responding was mediated by their 
diagnostic group. By contrast, there was no relationship between population and children’s 
responding to fair offers. These results suggest that the two populations have similar 
sensitivity and response patterns when a partner shares fairly, but their reactions differ when 
a partner shares unfairly. 
Dictator Game 
On average, children with ASD offered 2.87 (SD: 1.55; 35.88% of the total stake) 
stickers on their first turn in the proposer role, and 2.67 (SD: 1.4; 33.38%) stickers on their 
second turn. By contrast, TD children offered 2.44 (SD: 1.25; 30.5%) stickers on their first 
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turn as proposer, and 3.06 (SD: 1.31; 38.25%) on the second. As for the Ultimatum Game, a 
2 (Population: TD, ASD) x 2 (Offer: First, Second) mixed ANOVA revealed no main effects 
or interaction, indicating no significant differences between the first and second offers of 
either group. Similarly, a pair of 2 (Order: child first, puppet first) x 2 (Offer: first offer, 
second offer) mixed ANOVAs demonstrated that neither group was influenced by starting 
role when making offers in the Dictator Game. We then examined whether the populations 
differed when making initial offers without a prior cue (e.g. a preceding offer from the 
puppet). The results of the independent samples t-test indicated that the first offers of TD 
children and children with ASD who started in the proposer role did not significantly differ in 
the Dictator Game. 
As above, we examined the reciprocity of children’s offers. When the puppet made a 
fair offer, TD children responded with a fair offer 75% of the time, an offer that favoured 
themselves 19% of the time, or an offer that favoured the puppet 6% of the time. When the 
puppet made an unfair offer, TD children responded with an offer that favoured themselves 
100% of the time. As in the Ultimatum Game, the offers of TD children were apparently 
influenced by the puppet’s behavior; they reciprocated fair and unfair offers on 84% of trials. 
Opposite to the Ultimatum Game, TD children were 25% more likely to reciprocate unfair 
offers than fair offers. For children with ASD, when the puppet made a fair offer, they 
responded with a fair offer 50% of the time, an offer that favoured themselves 40% of the 
time, or an offer that favoured the puppet 10% of the time. When the puppet made an unfair 
offer, children with ASD responded with a fair offer 10% of the time, an offer that favoured 
themselves 80% of the time, and an offer that favoured the puppet 10% of the time. Thus, 
children with ASD reciprocated the puppet’s offers on 65% of trials overall.  
A GLMM was constructed to test whether children with ASD were statistically less 
likely to reciprocate the puppet’s offers in the Dictator Game. The analysis modelled the 
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probability (log odds) of children reciprocating the puppet’s offer (yes/no), considering 
variation across participants (random intercepts), fixed effects of Population (ASD/TD) and 
Puppet’s Offer (fair/unfair), plus the interaction between these variables. We conducted a 
sequence of GLMMs, entering fixed effects simultaneously. Model 1 was a “null model” 
containing only the random effect of participant ID. Model 2 added main effects of 
Population and Puppet’s Offer. Model 3 then added the Population x Puppet’s Offer 
interaction. Likelihood ratio tests were conducted to assess the relative utility of each model. 
These showed that inclusion of the main effects in Model 2 yielded a significant 
improvement in fit over the null model, χ2 (2) = 8.47, p = .015. Adding the interaction 
afforded no further improvement. Therefore, Model 2 provides the best fitting explanation of 
the observed data (see Table 2). 
[insert Table 2 here] 
The results revealed a borderline effect of Population, suggesting that children with 
ASD tended to reciprocate the puppet’s fair and unfair offers less frequently. There was also 
a highly-significant effect of Puppet’s Offer; across populations, children were significantly 
more likely to reciprocate unfair offers (90%) than fair offers (62.5%). Viewed alongside the 
opposing trend in the Ultimatum Game (74% fair vs 53% unfair), these results suggest that 
children moderated their reciprocity strategically overall. That is, they were more likely to 
reciprocate fair or unfair sharing depending on whether selfish behaviour could, or could not, 
be penalised by the responder. However, in contrast to this general trend, there was very little 
difference between reciprocation rates for fair offers by children with ASD in the Dictator 
Game and Ultimatum Game (50% vs 56%).  
Ultimatum Game vs Dictator Game 
We assessed children’s strategic resource allocation by making direct comparisons 
between offers on the Ultimatum and Dictator Games. We began by testing the interaction 
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between diagnosis and game type by entering children’s offers into a 2 (Population: TD, 
ASD) x 2 (Game: Ultimatum, Dictator) x 2 (Offer: First, Second) mixed ANOVA. There was 
a significant main effect of Game, F(1, 31) = 8.58, MSE = 1.17, p = .006, ηp2 = .22, 
indicating that both TD children and children with ASD made larger average offers in the 
Ultimatum Game (ASD M: 3.31; TD M: 3.39) than in the Dictator Game (ASD M: 2.77; TD 
M: 2.75). These results show that both populations adjusted the size of their offers in accord 
with the different game rules. There was also a significant Population x Game x Offer 
interaction, F(1, 31) = 6.37, MSE = 1.39, p = .017, ηp2 = .17. To establish the cause of the 3-
way interaction, separate 2 (Game) x 2 (Offer) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted 
on the data for each population. For children with ASD, there was a significant main effect of 
Game, F(1, 14) = 5.91, MSE = 0.55, p = .029, ηp2 = .3, confirming that offers in the 
Ultimatum Game were greater than offers in the Dictator Game. There was no effect of Offer 
and no interaction. For TD children, a significant main effect of Game was qualified by a 
significant Game x Offer interaction, F(1, 17) = 4.4, MSE = 1.67, p = .05, ηp2 = .21, which 
was explored via a series of Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise tests. First offers in the Ultimatum 
Game (M: 3.72) were significantly larger than first offers in the Dictator Game (M: 2.44), 
t(17) = 2.36, p = .03, d = .59. The difference between second offers was not significant, nor 
were the differences between first and second offers within either the Ultimatum Game or 
Dictator Game.  
Verbal responses 
The verbal responses provided by participants during the Ultimatum and Dictator 
Games were transcribed and a coding scheme was developed. Children’s comments were first 
categorised based on context (1. Following their offer, 2. In response to a fair offer from the 
puppet, 3. In response to an unfair offer from the puppet) and then allocated to a sub-category 
based on their content (see Table 3). The purpose of this coding system was to identify 
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whether children with ASD and TD children differ in how they justify their behaviour in 
different situations (e.g. by explicitly referring to fairness at different frequencies). Every 
comment was coded by the second experimenter and an independent rater with relevant 
expertise. The second rater was blind to the objectives of the study and the details of each 
child (e.g. their age, population, background scores). Reliability of the coding categories for 
each context was assessed via Cohen’s Kappa, which was calculated based on the two raters’ 
categorical classifications. High inter-rater reliability was achieved for all contexts 
(Following child’s offer: κ = .88, p < .01; Response to fair offer: κ = 1.00, p < .01; Response 
to unfair offer: κ = .86, p < .01). Disagreements in classifications were resolved by consensus 
between the two raters.  
[insert Table 3 here] 
Frequencies of response types made by TD children and children with ASD are 
shown in Table 4. Chi-square tests of independence showed that response types in each 
context were not mediated by population (following child’s offer: χ2 (3, N = 64) = 2.30, p = 
.51; response to fair offer: χ2 (2, N = 66) = .90, p = .64; response to unfair offer: χ2 (2, N = 66) 
= 3.58, p = .17).  
[insert Table 4 here] 
Unexpected contents 
 All children correctly answered the memory check correctly (“what is really inside 
[the Smarties tub]?”). Children scored 0-2 based on how many of Theory of Mind questions 
they answered correctly. Mean scores for the children with ASD and TD children were .59 
and 1.33 respectively, a significant difference, t(33) = 2.48, p = .019, d = .86. It is noteworthy 
that 65% of the ASD group answered both Theory of Mind questions incorrectly (compared 
with 28% of the TD group), indicating their difficulty understanding their own and others’ 
mental states.  
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The influence of children’s theory of mind task performance on their offers in the 
Ultimatum/Dictator Games was examined. Children were assigned to a ‘fail’ category if they 
answered both unexpected contents test questions incorrectly or a ‘pass’ category if they 
answered at least one test question correctly (further sub-dividing participants based on one 
or two correct answers would have resulted in insufficient sample sizes). Children’s offers in 
the Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game were entered into a pair of 2 (Population: TD, ASD) 
x 2 (Theory of Mind: Pass, Fail) x 2 (Offer: First, Second) mixed ANOVAs. The analysis for 
the Ultimatum Game revealed a significant Theory of Mind x Offer interaction, F(1, 29) = 
4.78, MSE = 2.42, p = .037, ηp2 = .14, which was explored using Bonferroni-adjusted 
pairwise tests. Children who failed both theory of mind test questions made significantly 
smaller first offers (M = 2.57) than those who passed at least one (M = 3.95), t(31) = 2.24, p = 
.032, d = .82. However, the second offers made by the pass and fail groups did not differ. The 
‘fail’ group showed an almost-significant tendency to make larger second offers (M = 3.64) 
than first offers (M = 2.57), t(13) = 2.03, p = .06, d = .55, while the ‘pass’ group showed a 
non-significant trend in the opposite direction (first offer M = 3.95; second offer M = 3.00; 
t(18) = 1.8, p = .09, d = .42). No other main effects or interactions were significant. 
The analysis for the Dictator Game revealed no main effects or interactions. Taken 
together, these findings indicate that Theory of Mind (rather than ASD) influences children’s 
opening offers in the Ultimatum Game, but not the relatively less strategic Dictator Game.  
Discussion 
This study compared how children with ASD and language-matched TD controls 
shared resources in age-appropriate versions of the Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game. In 
contrast to previous ASD research, children were required to share real stickers – a tangible 
and desirable commodity – with an interactive partner in a face-to-face context. In addition to 
measuring their offers and responses, we also examined children’s tendency to reciprocate 
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the puppet’s behaviour, and recorded their qualitative comments in a variety of situations. 
The results revealed many similarities in the way that TD children and children with ASD 
played the resource exchange games; both groups indicated a preference for equality over 
self-interest  when making offers, they offered more stickers in the Ultimatum Game than the 
Dictator Game, and they explicitly referred to ‘fairness’ at similar rates. However, we 
observed important between-group differences in reciprocity that suggest ASD impacts 
children’s ability to modify their sharing based on others’ behaviour.  
When required to share stickers with a partner, Lucas et al (2008) found that TD 
children aged 4-5 years demonstrated a preference for equality by offering 47% of their stake 
in the Ultimatum Game and 40% in the Dictator Game. In the present study, TD children 
aged 3-6 years offered 42% of their stake in the Ultimatum Game and 34% in the Dictator 
Game. Surprisingly, children with ASD made very similar average offers of 40% and 35% in 
the Ultimatum and Dictator Games respectively. The two groups also explicitly commented 
about fairness at similar rates when making and responding to offers. These results support 
those of Sally and Hill (2006) and oppose the theory that sharing in ASD is increasingly 
governed by self-interest. Thus, despite the natural desire to retain one’s own material 
possessions, the offers of TD children and children with ASD do not align with the economic 
model of rational self-interest (Camerer, 2003).  
Many studies have posited that fair and reciprocal sharing is underpinned by the 
ability to represent and understand others’ intentions, emotions, and perspectives (Brownell 
et al., 2013; Castelli et al., 2014; Lucas et al., 2008; Schelling, 1960). Although many 
children in the ASD group showed impaired ToM (65% failed both questions in the false 
belief task), this deficit did not influence the average value of their offers. Our results showed 
that children across both populations who failed both false belief questions tended to make 
significantly smaller first offers than peers who answered at least one question correctly. This 
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may suggest that children who are yet to develop ToM are less concerned about making a 
positive impression at the start of the interaction that would establish their reputation as a 
good social partner. By contrast, children with more sophisticated understanding of mental 
states may be increasingly mindful that acting in their partner’s interests is likely to promote 
a cooperative and cohesive interaction.  
Although the average offer values did not differ between populations, we observed 
several important indicators that ASD affects children’s ability to evaluate the fairness of 
others’ sharing behaviours and to reciprocate accordingly. While both groups were heavily 
biased towards accepting the puppet’s fair offers in the Ultimatum Game, children with ASD 
were almost 30% more likely than TD children to accept unfair offers. This finding replicates 
Sally and Hill (2006), and aligns with previous observations that children with ASD prefer 
resource allocations that maximise benefits across parties (Schmitz et al., 2015). One 
explanation for this behaviour is that deficits in social-cognition (e.g. Chevallier et al., 2012) 
cause children with ASD to be less concerned about defending norms associated with 
reciprocal and cooperative interaction. Consequently, these children might be increasingly 
motivated by instrumental outcomes, irrespective of whether they are personally advantaged 
or disadvantaged (Paulus & Rosal-Grifoll, 2016; Schmitz et al., 2015). To a child with ASD, 
accepting an unfair offer may be favourable because it yields a greater physical reward than 
rejection. Thus, the responses of children with ASD indicate an approach to sharing that is 
characterized by reduced interest in social-relational outcomes and diminished aversion to 
inequity. By contrast, TD individuals almost always reject unfair offers because of their 
strong preference for equality and their desire to establish a mutually-beneficial and 
cooperative relationship (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Hoffman et al., 2008; Lucas et al., 2008).  
Intriguingly, in the Ultimatum Game, children with ASD were 37% less likely to 
reciprocate fair offers and 22% less likely to reciprocate unfair offers. This significant 
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between-population difference clearly indicates that children with ASD did not adapt their 
behaviour in accordance with the puppet’s. Children with ASD also showed reduced 
reciprocation in the Dictator Game, and both groups were significantly more likely to 
reciprocate unfair offers than fair offers in this context. It would appear that both groups 
realised that the power imbalance enabled them to reciprocate self-interest oriented behaviour 
without fear of consequence. By contrast, both groups were more hesitant to reciprocate 
unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game, presumably recognising that the partner still needed to 
be appeased (despite their selfish behaviour) in order to gain stickers. In this more socially-
strategic context, TD children reciprocated 93% of the puppet’s fair offers, clearly indicating 
their adherence to the cultural norm of fairness and their concern for keeping the puppet 
“onside”. By contrast, children with ASD demonstrated much lower, and highly similar, 
reciprocation rates for fair offers in both the Ultimatum Game (56%) and Dictator Game 
(50%). This striking finding highlights an interesting conundrum: children with ASD may 
possess and exercise an explicit notion of fairness (as indicated by their offer values and 
comments), yet it does not appear to be informed by others’ prosocial behaviour.   
While children with ASD may learn a ‘fairness heuristic’ that generally privileges 
equality (Sally & Hill, 2006), we propose that fundamental deficits in social-cognition and 
interaction may diminish the perceived importance of reciprocal fairness. This is epitomised 
by their failure to recognise the strategic importance of reciprocal fair sharing in the 
Ultimatum Game. It is theorised that TD children’s inclination to reciprocate fair behaviour 
serves to promote cooperation, social cohesion, and foster mutually beneficial relationships 
(Hoffman et al., 2008). These positive interpersonal outcomes may be less important to 
children with ASD due to their reduced social motivation and impaired ability to represent 
others’ mental states (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Chevallier et al., 2012). Alternatively, differences 
in reciprocity when sharing may be related to impaired self-understanding in ASD (Frith, 
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2003; Lind, 2010). Typically, as a child’s understanding of the self develops, so too does 
their understanding of others (Moore, 2007). Children with greater self-understanding may be 
better able to reflect and act on the needs of others by drawing comparisons with their own 
situation and experiences (Brownell et al., 2013). However, deficits in self-concept 
development are well-documented in ASD, including atypical use of first person pronouns 
(Jordan, 1996; Lee, Hobson, & Chiat, 1994; Lind & Bowler, 2009), reduced understanding of 
emotions (Ben Shalom et al., 2006; Hill, Berthoz & Frith, 2004; Silani et al., 2008; Williams 
& Happé, 2010), and impoverished memory for personal facts and events (Bruck, London, 
Landa, & Goodman, 2007; Goddard, Howlin, Dritschel, & Patel, 2007). Consequently, these 
impairments in self-understanding may inhibit children’s ability to behave reciprocally in a 
dynamic sharing interaction. Future research is required to tease apart these theoretical 
explanations. 
Importantly, reduced reciprocity and decreased inequality aversion when sharing 
could severely impact children’s ability to navigate the social world. The formation and 
maintenance of positive social relationships requires interpersonal reciprocity (Adamson et 
al., 2010; Hoffman et al., 2008), and failure to return prosocial behaviour could elicit 
negative affect in peers and lead to marginalization (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; de Quervain et 
al., 2004). Furthermore, difficulties communicating and understanding others’ mental states 
may reduce the ability of children with ASD to identify or appraise social feedback indicating 
how their behaviour is being perceived (Schroeder et al., 2014). These deficits may inhibit 
the ability of children with ASD to make friends (Bauminger et al., 2008), which in turn 
exacerbates their vulnerability to bullying (van Roekel et al., 2010). Worryingly, our results 
suggest that children with ASD might be particularly susceptible to bullies exploiting their 
lower concern for personal gain and their increased tolerance of unfair behavior. Moreover, 
their social naivety and impaired understanding of others’ intentions may inhibit children 
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with ASD from even recognizing when they are being bullied or unfairly manipulated 
(Sofronoff, Dark & Stone, 2011; van Roekel et al., 2010). These issues may be particularly 
prominent for children with delayed language development, such as those tested in our study 
(Zablotsky, Bradshaw, Anderson, & Law, 2014). We advocate that anti-bullying 
interventions address these risks by explicitly teaching children the importance of 
reciprocating prosocial actions, highlighting cues that indicate they are being treated unfairly, 
teaching prevention strategies, and role-playing good sharing behaviours (Humphrey & 
Hebron, 2015; Sofronoff, Dark, & Stone, 2011).   
Of course, we must address the limitations of this study. Firstly, it is possible that the 
observed between-population differences were related to general limitations in cognitive 
functioning in the ASD sample, or differences in sharing experience associated with 
chronological age (the ASD group were significantly older than the TD controls). We 
acknowledge that including a sample of children with delayed intellectual development 
matched to children with ASD on non-verbal intelligence and chronological age would have 
eliminated this issue. However, this limitation may be mitigated by (a) the fact that our TD 
participants responded similarly to TD adults in previous studies (e.g. they offered 
approximately 40% of the stake in the Ultimatum Game, and made significantly lower offers 
in the Dictator Game; Camerer, 2003), indicating maturity in how they approached the two 
tasks, (b) TD children’s offers in the Ultimatum and Dictator Games are not influenced by 
variability in non-verbal intelligence (Han, Shi, Yong, & Wang, 2012), and (c) offers made 
by young adults with Down Syndrome, another population with general intellectual 
difficulties, do not statistically differ from those of TD controls in the Ultimatum Game 
(Rêgo, Campanhã, Egito, & Boggio, 2017). Secondly, the Ultimatum and Dictator Games 
directly encouraged children to share their endowed property with the puppet. It is possible 
that children with ASD may behave differently in naturalistic social situations that lack the 
FAIRNESS & RECIPROCITY  25 
 
structure and scaffolding of our experimental tasks, or when required to share different kinds 
of resources (e.g. attachment objects, food, etc). Thus, it would be very interesting to 
systematically investigate spontaneous sharing in children with ASD and the conditions that 
are necessary to promote this behaviour in naturalistic contexts (see Brownell et al., 2013). It 
would also be valuable to explore how differences in sharing behaviour in ASD directly 
relate to friendship building and bullying. Thirdly, we acknowledge that children’s behaviour 
within and across games may have been influenced by their relatively unique history with the 
puppet. The counterbalanced nature of turn orders within games coupled with the puppet’s 
randomised responses (irrespective of offer fairness) meant that the nature of the interaction 
varied across participants. Indeed, children’s behaviour in the second game may have been 
influenced from the outset by the puppet’s actions in game one. Although we have examined 
the relationship between the child’s and puppet’s behaviour in our reciprocation analyses, 
much larger sample sizes would be required to identify how each variation of the interaction 
reliably impacts children’s behaviour.       
In summary, our study has shown that children with ASD and TD children offered 
similar numbers of stickers to a puppet in age-appropriate versions of the classic Dictator and 
Ultimatum Games. Both groups showed willingness to share equally and neither prioritised 
self-interest. However, children with ASD were significantly less likely to reciprocate the 
puppet’s offers (especially in the Ultimatum Game). In naturalistic contexts, failure to 
reciprocate fair sharing may significantly impact on social cohesion and children’s ability to 
build relationships (particularly in contexts that depend on the goodwill of a partner). 
Children with ASD were also much more likely to accept unfair offers, indicating reduced 
aversion to inequality. We propose that these important differences in sharing behaviour may 
be linked to broader deficits in social-cognitive development and potentially self-other 
understanding. These findings inform wider understanding of social interaction deficits that 
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characterise ASD and further specify the nature of their difficulties related to sharing in 
dynamic social interactions. 
Compliance with Ethical Standards 
All procedures performed in this study involving human participants were in 
accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and national research committee and 
with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards. 
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Table 1. Summary of the final Generalized Linear Mixed-effects Model (log odds) of 
children’s offer reciprocation in the Ultimatum Game as predicted by Population (ASD, TD) 
and Puppet’s Offer (Fair, Unfair); note that the ASD group and puppet’s fair offer are taken 
as reference levels 
 
Note. AIC: Akaike information criterion; BIC: Bayesian information criterion; logLik: log-



















Std. error Z Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) 0.55 0.6 0.91 0.36 
Population (TD)  1.43 0.69 2.09 0.04 
Puppet’s Offer (Unfair) -1.13 0.69 -1.64 0.1 
 AIC BIC logLik deviance 
 59.3 66.6 -25.6 51.3 
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Table 2. Summary of the final Generalized Linear Mixed-effects Model (log odds) of 
children’s offer reciprocation in the Dictator Game as predicted by Population (ASD, TD) 
and Puppet’s Offer (Fair, Unfair); note that the ASD group and puppet’s fair offer are taken 
as reference levels 
 
Note. AIC: Akaike information criterion; BIC: Bayesian information criterion; logLik: log-



















Std. error Z Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) -0.16 0.6 -0.27 0.79 
Population (TD)  1.4 0.79 1.78 0.07 
Puppet’s Offer (Unfair) 2.03 0.9 2.26 0.02 
 AIC BIC logLik deviance 
 51.7 59.3 -21.9 43.7 
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Justifies offer without reference to 
ownership or fairness/sharing 
“Just a good amount” 
 Fairness 
Justifies offer with an explicit 
reference to a notion of 
fairness/sharing 




Justifies offer with reference to 
ownership or wanting more than 
the puppet 
“I want to keep all my 
ones” 
 Prosocial Offer 
Indicates they were trying to elicit 
a positive emotional state in their 
partner 
“Make him happy with 
that many” 
Response to fair 
offer 
Positive Simple 
Expresses satisfaction with 
reference to emotion or number 
“That’s a good number” 
 Negative Simple 
Expresses dissatisfaction with 
reference to emotions or number 
“Not happy” 
 Fairness 
Explicit reference to a notion of 
fairness/sharing 





Expresses satisfaction with 
reference to emotion or number 
“I want this one” 
 Negative Simple 
Expresses dissatisfaction with 
reference to emotions or number 
“I wanted more” 
 Fairness 
Explicit reference to a notion of 
fairness/sharing 
“I want same amount, is 
really not fair” 
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Table 4. Frequencies of qualitative response types made by TD children and children with 
ASD in the Ultimatum and Dictator Games 
 
  Population 
Context Category ASD TD 
Following child’s offer Simple 2 (7%) 3 (9%) 
 Fairness 13 (43%) 19 (56%) 
 Ownership/Selfishness 6 (20%) 7 (21%) 
 Prosocial Offer 9 (30%) 5 (14%) 
Response to fair offer Positive Simple 18 (60%) 20 (55%) 
 Positive Negative 0 (0%)  1 (3%) 
 Fairness 12 (40%)  15 (42%) 
Response to unfair offer Positive Simple 7 (23%) 3 (8%) 
 Positive Negative 15 (50%) 25 (69%)  
 Fairness 8 (27%) 8 (23%)  
 
 
